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Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash
MICHAEL FAULKENDER and RONG WANG∗
ABSTRACT
We examine the cross-sectional variation in the marginal value of corporate cash holdings that
arises from differences in corporate financial policy. We begin by providing semi-quantitative
predictions for the value of an extra dollar of cash depending upon the likely use of that dollar,
and derive a set of intuitive hypotheses to test empirically. By examining the variation in
excess stock returns over the fiscal year, we find that the marginal value of cash declines with
larger cash holdings, higher leverage, better access to capital markets, and greater as firms
choose cash distribution via dividends rather than repurchases.
∗Faulkender and Wang are at the Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis. We thank
Luca Benzoni, Murillo Campello, Gerald Garvey, Robert Goldstein, Todd Milbourn, Mitchell Petersen, Robert
Stambaugh (the editor), Rene Stulz, Rohan Williamson, an anonymous referee, the associate editor, and seminar
participants at Washington University in St. Louis and the 2004Western Finance Association Annual Conference
for helpful comments.
1
What value do shareholders place on the cash that firms hold, and how does that value differ
across firms? While an extensive literature attempts to estimate the value of adding debt to a
firm’s capital structure, the search for estimates of the value of additional cash has not received
nearly as much attention. This is a non trivial oversight considering corporate liquidity enables
firms to make investments without having to access external capital markets, and to thereby
avoid both transaction costs on either debt or equity issuance and information asymmetry
costs that are often associated with equity issuances. Moreover, corporate liquidity reduces the
likelihood of incurring financial distress costs if the firm’s operations do not generate sufficient
cash flow to service obligatory debt payments. Corporate liquidity comes at a cost,however,
since interest earned on corporate cash reserves is often taxed at a higher rate than interest
earned by individuals. Further, cash may provide funds for managers to invest in projects
that offer non pecuniary benefits but destroy shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
Given the extent to which the literature examines the effect of these same frictions on capital
structure, it is surprising that the value implications of holding cash in the presence of these
frictions have not been similarly explored.1
Recent empirical studies of corporate cash holdings (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999) and Harford (1999)) examine the cross-sectional variation in the level of cash
holdings related to the above theoretical benefits and costs.2 Consistent with the hypothesized
effects, they find that firms with stronger growth opportunities, riskier cash flows, and more
limited access to capital markets hold higher cash balances. Now that we understand the
characteristics that determine how much cash firms hold, we move to the question of what value
the market places on the cash holdings of firms and how that value varies cross-sectionally.
In generating empirical predictions, we argue that the value (to the equity holder) of one
additional dollar of cash reserves should vary considerably depending upon whether that dollar
is more likely to go to: 1) Increasing distributions to equity via dividend payments or share
repurchases, 2) decreasing the amount of cash that needs to be raised in the capital markets,
depending upon the firm’s capital market accessibility, or 3) servicing debt or other liabilities
of the firm.
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For firms whose cash reserves appear to greatly exceed their needs in the foreseeable future,
an additional dollar of cash reserves is more likely to be distributed to equity holders through
dividends and/or stock repurchases. However, because of the “dividend tax”, only the fraction
(1− τ
d
) ends up in the hands of shareholders.3 As such, the marginal value of cash is reduced
to (1 − τ
d
), which can be significantly below $1. Additionally, if firms use their cash to pay
down debt or other liabilities, a small increase in cash reserves partially goes to increasing debt
value, not solely to increasing equity value. Thus, the equity market will place a lower value on
an additional dollar of cash for high leverage firms relative to the marginal value of cash for a
firm with little debt. In contrast, for those firms that need to raise cash from external markets
because they have value-enhancing investment opportunities but their internal funds are low,
the marginal value of cash should be higher than $1, with the exact amount depending upon
the transactions costs (direct or otherwise) that are incurred by accessing the capital markets.
Therefore, the marginal value of cash should decline as cash holdings increase because as the
cash position of the firm improves, firms become more likely to distribute funds and less likely
to raise cash.
We also argue that for firms that face greater financing constraints, especially those with
valuable investment opportunities, the marginal value of cash should be higher than for firms
that can easily raise additional capital. While financial constraints are often associated with
information asymmetries between firms and capital providers, they can be thought of as tan-
tamount to higher transactions costs in accessing external capital. In such a context, an
additional dollar of internal funds enables a constrained firm to avoid these higher costs of
raising funds,thereby, rendering additional internal funds relatively more valuable.
Below, we use these arguments to formalize hypotheses about how the marginal value of
cash should vary across firm characteristics. We then test these hypotheses empirically and
find broad support for them. Indeed, our main empirical results include:
• The average marginal value of cash across all firms is $0.94.
• As firms’ cash levels and leverage increase, their marginal value of cash decreases signif-
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icantly.
• For those firms that distribute cash, the marginal value of cash is $0.13 higher if they
do so by stock repurchase rather than by dividend payments. This number is consistent
with a dividend tax rate that is 13% higher than the capital gains tax rate on repurchases
for the marginal shareholder.4
• The average marginal value of cash for those firms that are likely to have more difficulty
accessing capital is significantly higher than for those firms that are less likely to be
constrained.
• The difference in the marginal value of cash between constrained firms and unconstrained
firms is especially large among those firms that appear to have valuable investment
opportunities but low levels of internal funds.
In a similar paper, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) also examine the marginal value of
cash, focusing largely on the cross-sectional variation related to the firm’s investment oppor-
tunity set.5 Using the methodology of Fama and French (1998), they find that shareholders
of a firm with better growth options and more volatile investment opportunities place higher
values on the firm’s cash than a firm with fewer, more stable growth opportunities. In con-
trast, we focus on how the value of cash varies with firm financial characteristics and we use
a methodology that examines the variation in excess equity returns rather than in the level of
the market-to-book ratio. Because we normalize all independent variables by the firm’s equity
value at the end of the previous fiscal year, we can interpret our estimated coefficients as the
change in equity value associated with a $1 change in the corresponding independent variable.
Using this methodological approach, we report estimated coefficients that appear to be both
quantitatively and qualitatively consistent with all of our hypotheses.
In Section I, we argue that there are essentially three different cash regimes and that
the marginal value of cash depends upon the likelihood with which a firm will find itself in
each of these different regimes. We then generate a set of hypotheses for how the marginal
value of cash should be affected by changes in the level of corporate liquidity, the amount of
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debt in the firm’s capital structure, and the accessibility of external capital. In Section II,
we discuss the empirical methodology that we utilize to test these hypotheses and provide
further explanations for why we prefer this approach in estimating the value associated with a
particular firm characteristic. The data sources and summary statistics are provided in Section
III.
Section IV contains the results of testing our empirical hypotheses. We begin with our
baseline specification, which estimates the effects of leverage and the level of cash on the mar-
ginal value of cash for the firms in our sample. Because our approach uses excess returns,
estimating the marginal value of cash requires estimating the unexpected change in the firm’s
cash position over the corresponding return period. We therefore conduct numerous robustness
tests in which we estimate the expected change in cash and then use the difference between
the realized change and the expected change in our analysis. As the results demonstrate, our
findings are quite stable, both statistically and economically, across these different measures.
We then move on to utilize multiple definitions of being financially constrained to examine
how capital market accessibility impacts the value that the market places on additional cor-
porate cash. Finally, we examine subsamples of firm-years that are most likely to fall into our
three cash regimes and further demonstrate that the estimated marginal values of cash have
differences that are consistent with our hypotheses. Section V concludes.
I. Three Cash Regimes
As mentioned in the Introduction, the value (to the equity holder) of one additional dollar
of cash reserves should vary considerably depending upon the cash regime to which a firm
is likely to belong. The identification of the three different regimes here is similar to that
of Hennessy and Whited (2005), who investigate optimal dynamic capital structure.6 This
identification is important because it not only allows us to make qualitative predictions for
how the marginal value of cash should vary cross-sectionally, but it also allows us to provide
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semi-quantitative estimates for the marginal value of cash cross-sectionally.
A. Regime I: Distributing Cash
Consider a firm that is currently carrying excess cash in that the sum of current cash on
hand and expected short-term earnings is more than sufficient to fund both the short term
liabilities of the firm and any possible investments in new value-enhancing projects that may
arise. If there were no costs to holding cash, then it would be optimal for the firm to retain
large cash reserves rather than distribute the excess cash in order to guarantee that the firm
will not need to incur the transaction costs associated with raising cash. However, taxes and
agency costs generate costs to holding excess cash. First, because the corporate tax rate is
generally higher than the personal tax rate paid on interest income, investors are better off if
they hold excess cash themselves rather than the firm. Second, agency costs due to the “free
cash flow” problem (Jensen (1986)) are more likely for firms with excess cash reserves. Hence,
it will be optimal for firms with excess cash to distribute funds to shareholders via dividends
or share repurchases, and shareholders will not place a high value on a marginal dollar of cash
for these firms.
Specifically, we argue that the marginal value of cash for firms that are likely to distribute
large sums of cash is less than $1. Defining τ
d
as the tax rate on dividends, only (1 − τ
d
) of
every dollar distributed by the firm in the form of dividends finds its way into the hands of
shareholders. Moreover, the fact that the corporate tax rate τc on earned interest is typically
greater than the tax rate τi on earned interest for individuals implies that the marginal value of
any excess cash that is not immediately distributed is significantly lower than (1−τ
d
). Indeed,
consider the extreme example of a firm with no debt whose only asset is cash placed into a
risk-free security. Without taxes and payouts, the cash holdings grow according to
dCt = r Ct dt. (1)
However, if we assume that earnings are taxed at τc and that the cash payout is a fraction β
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of the after-tax earnings, then the cash holdings grow according to
dCt = r Ct (1− τc) (1− β) dt, (2)
implying that
Ct = C0e
r t (1−τc )(1−β). (3)
Moreover, the distribution to shareholders over the interval dt would be
dX = r Ct (1− τc) β dt, (4)
which would be taxed at the dividend rate τ
d
. Note that this after-tax cash flow is risk free
so the appropriate discount rate for this stream of cash flows is the personal after-tax risk-free
rate r (1− τi). Hence, the value of this equity claim is
E(C0) =
∫ ∞
0
dX (1− τ
d
) e−rt(1−τi)
= C0 (1− τd) (1− τc) r β
∫ ∞
0
er t (1−τc)(1−β)e−rt(1−τi) dt
= C0 (1− τd)
(1− τc) β
(1− τi)− (1− τc) (1− β)
(5)
and the marginal value of cash for this firm is
∂E
∂C
= (1− τ
d
)
(1− τc) β
(1− τi)− (1− τc) (1− β)
. (6)
Note that in the special case in which τc = τi , that is, interest earned by the corporation is
not taxed more heavily than interest earned by individuals, then equation (6) reduces to
∂E
∂C
= (1− τ
d
) . (7)
However, even small differences between τc and τi can have large effects on the marginal value
of cash for levels of β that are observed in the data. For example, if we consider the base case
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τ
d
= 0.25, τc = 0.35, τi = 0.30, and β = 0.25, we find that the marginal value of cash for this
“cash cow” is
∂E
∂C
= 0.57, (8)
which is significantly lower than (1− τ
d
) = 0.75 due to the dividend tax alone. This result is
reminiscent of the insights of Berk and Stanton (2004) who demonstrate that the closed-end
fund discount can be explained by a small cost given that the payout ratio is small. This
result suggests that the marginal value of cash for firms with excess cash (i.e., bad investment
opportunities and high cash levels) are predicted to be well below $1. The presence of agency
costs due to free cash flow problems would only reduce this estimate further.
B. Regime II: Servicing Debt or Other Liabilities
For highly leveraged firms, contingent claims analysis (e.g., Black and Scholes (1973),
Merton (1973)) predicts that almost all firm value is in the hands of the debt holders. As such,
a small increase in cash reserves goes largely to increasing debt value, not equity value, implying
in turn that the equity market will place a low value on an additional dollar of cash for these
firms. Furthermore, this “option theory” predicts that the marginal value of cash to equity
holders should increase as leverage declines, since the probability of avoiding bankruptcy, and
therefore the probability of the extra dollar finding its way into the pocket of equity holders,
increases.
C. Regime III: Raising Cash
We argue that the marginal value of cash for firms that are likely to raise cash in the near
future should be higher than $1, and that the amount varies depending upon the ease with
which the firm can access the capital markets.
Consider two firms that need to raise capital immediately because they have a value-
enhancing project and their current cash holdings are low. Assume that these firms are identical
except that Firm A has one additional dollar of cash reserves. Hence, Firm B needs to raise
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one more dollar of cash than Firm A to fund the investment. In the presence of a proportional
transactions cost (direct or otherwise) f that is incurred by accessing the capital markets,
raising this additional dollar will cost Firm B an additional
(
1
1−f
)
.
For firms that raise cash optimally, the marginal value of cash should reach an upper bound
of 11−f . The argument is straightforward: If the market currently values an additional dollar
of cash at higher than 11−f , then the firm can increase its equity value by raising additional
cash now. Hence, under the objective of shareholder-maximizing behavior, firms should raise
their cash levels so that the marginal value of cash never exceeds 11−f . Assuming transactions
costs are not too high, this argument suggests that the marginal value of cash will be slightly
greater than $1 for “unconstrained” firms that are at the margin of raising cash. As firms face
financing constraints, which can be thought of as larger transactions costs f (whether direct
or indirect), they are expected to have even higher marginal values of cash, all else equal.
D. Empirical Predictions
Now that we have explained why the marginal value of cash should vary considerably de-
pending upon which regime the firm is likely to face, we seek to link firm financial characteristics
to these regimes, by specifying a set of hypotheses that we empirically test below.
HYPOTHESIS 1: The marginal value of cash is decreasing in the level of the firm’s cash
position.
A firm with a low level of cash reserves is more likely than firms with high cash balances
to be in the third cash regime, that is, needing to access the external capital markets to fund
its short-term liabilities and investments. Due to the transactions costs (direct and indirect)
incurred by accessing the capital markets, the value of an additional dollar of cash for such a
firm is greater than one. Holding profitability constant, as cash holdings increase, the firm is
less likely to access capital markets in the near future and is instead more likely to return cash
to shareholders. Thus, greater cash levels reduce the probability of the firm being in regime
three and instead, the first cash regime becomes more likely, in which case the value of an
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additional dollar of cash could be significantly lower than one, due to higher corporate tax
rates relative to investor tax rates and the free cash flow problem. Therefore, for firms that
are not near bankruptcy, the marginal value of cash should be a decreasing function of the
cash level, as the likelihood of being in the high marginal cash value regime diminishes and
the likelihood of being in the lower marginal value of cash regime increases.
HYPOTHESIS 2: An extra dollar of cash holdings is less valuable for shareholders in highly
levered firms than in firms with low leverage.
This hypothesis is common in most capital structure models. As firms generate more cash
flow or accumulate higher cash balances, if the debt is risky, the increase in firm value is shared
by the debt and equity holders. For firms with low leverage, and therefore less risky debt, an
increase in the firm’s cash position has very little impact on the probability of the debt holders
being paid in full. As leverage increases, all else equal, more of the firm value generated by
additional cash benefits the debt holders. This effect can be motivated by interpreting an
equity security as a call option on the firm’s value and thinking of the debt holders as being
short a put option on the value of the firm. As the strike price increases, that is, as the firm
takes on more debt, holding constant the value of the firm, the delta of the option decreases.
So, while an increase in cash increases the value of the underlying firm, thereby increasing the
value of both the debt and the equity, more of the value associated with the increase in cash
will accrue to the equity holders as the firm has less leverage.7
HYPOTHESIS 3: An extra dollar of cash holdings is more valuable for shareholders in finan-
cially constrained firms.
Returning to our discussion of firms that access capital markets, a firm that faces financial
constraints can be thought of as facing a higher cost f when raising external funds. As a
result, the marginal value of cash may be higher for these firms since internal funds enable the
firm to avoid incurring this higher cost. Additionally, if the firm has investment opportunities,
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the higher the cost of raising external funds, the more likely it is that these value-enhancing
projects will be forgone if internal funds are insufficient. Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988) document the presence of an investment cash flow sensitivity that is consistent with
financial constraints deterring firms from being able to make investments when internal funds
are insufficient to fund them. If capital market access were perfect, then regardless of the
firm’s liquidity, it would always be able to fund positive net present value (NPV) projects. As
access to capital becomes more difficult, forgoing positive NPV projects is more likely, absent
internal funds. Therefore, for constrained firms, higher cash holdings increase the likelihood of
taking positive NPV projects that would otherwise be forgone, whereas liquidity provides no
such benefit for unconstrained firms. This effect should be most prevalent for firms that are
more likely to have investment opportunities but little internal cash with which to fund those
investments.
There are numerous other studies that present evidence consistent with our third hypoth-
esis. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) find that target leverage is counter cyclical for relatively
unconstrained firms, but pro cyclical for relatively constrained firms; unconstrained firms time
their security issuance to coincide with periods of favorable macroeconomic conditions, while
constrained firms do not. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find that financially con-
strained firms systematically save cash out of cash flow while unconstrained firms do not.
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2004) build upon those results by separating out constrained
firms based upon the correlation between cash flow and investment opportunities. They show
that financially constrained firms whose investment opportunities arise when operating cash
flows are relatively low save cash rather than pay down debt. On the other hand, unconstrained
firms and constrained firms with a high correlation between the presence of investment oppor-
tunities and high cash flows pay down debt rather than save cash. These previous empirical
results support the hypothesis that the accessibility of capital affects the capital structure and
liquidity choices of firms, which should be accompanied by differences in the value of cash
across firms with differential access.8
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II. Empirical Methodology
In this paper, the basic questions we investigate are what value do shareholders place on
an extra dollar of cash held by firms, and what financial characteristics affect that value? If
shareholders believe that difficulty in accessing capital markets may sometimes lead firms to
forgo value-creating investments, then a dollar of cash may be worth more than a dollar. Alter-
natively, if shareholders believe that extra cash only serves to increase (taxable) distributions,
or only generates free cash flow problems, then the marginal value of cash may be significantly
less than $1.
To test these hypotheses, we develop a methodology that generates estimates of the addi-
tional value the market incorporates into equity values that result from changes in the cash
position of firms over the fiscal year. Following Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and Daniel
and Titman (1997), our dependent variable is a stock’s excess return over the fiscal year, which
is defined to be stock i’s return during fiscal year t less the return of stock i’s benchmark port-
folio during fiscal year t. The benchmark portfolios, defined below, are designed to offset the
expected return component of stock i due to its size and market-to-book ratio at the beginning
of the fiscal year. We regress that excess return on changes in firm characteristics, focusing on
the estimated coefficient that corresponds to the variable measuring the ratio of the unexpected
change in cash to the firm’s lagged equity value.9 Since both the dependent and independent
variables are standardized by the lagged market value of equity, the coefficient measures the
dollar change in shareholder value resulting from a one dollar change in the amount of cash
held by the firm.
We argue that our methodology for estimating the value associated with a firm charac-
teristic is an improvement over the Fama and French (1998) methodology, which focuses on
the cross-sectional variation in the market-to-book ratio, for two important reasons. First, we
incorporate time-varying risk factors into our estimation. Part of the time-series variability
in the market-to-book ratio used in Fama and French (1998) should come from differences
over time in the compensation for risk, and therefore the market value of the firm. Their
methodology controls for firm-specific characteristics that affect expected cash flows, but does
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not include measures that capture differences in sensitivities to risk factors, and therefore dif-
ferences in discount rates. We address this by using a stock’s benchmark return to control for
the time-series variation in risk factors and the cross-sectional variation in exposures to those
factors.10 Second, with regard to the dependent variable, unlike the ratio of market-to-book,
equity returns are easy to measure and interpret. Fama and French (1998) note that they
would “prefer to measure assets at replacement cost, but we do not have the necessary data.”
As a result, part of the variability in market-to-book may result from the cross-sectional dif-
ferences in accounting for the book value of assets relative to their true replacement cost. If
accounting methods across firms are correlated with liquidity, this correlation might bias the
estimates of the marginal value of cash.11
We recognize that stock returns should be affected both by common risk factors and by
changes in firm-specific characteristics. Since firm-specific risk factors are very noisy and can
be diversified away, most papers in the asset pricing literature only look at portfolio returns.
However, since the emphasis of this paper is how changes in cash holdings affect shareholder
wealth, we need to examine individual stocks instead of portfolios. While we are interested in
the change in equity value associated with changes in the cash holdings of firms, it is important
to control for other factors that may be correlated with changes in cash that may also affect
firm value. Therefore, we regress the excess equity return over the fiscal year on not only the
change in cash holdings, but also on changes in a firm’s profitability, financing policy, and
investment policy. We initially assume that firms have the same sensitivity to these firm-
specific factors. We then test our hypotheses by including interaction terms and by examining
differences in coefficients across subsamples. Throughout the analysis, our focus is on the value
of the unexpected change in cash, captured by its coefficient and the coefficients corresponding
to interactions with other financial variables.
To arrive at our estimate of the excess return, we use the 25 Fama and French portfolios
formed on size and book-to-market as our benchmark portfolios. A portfolio return is a value-
weighted return based on market capitalization within each of the 25 portfolios. For each year,
we group every firm into one of 25 size and BE/ME portfolios based on the intersection between
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the size and book-to-market independent sorts. Fama and French (1993) conclude that size
and the book-to-market of equity proxy for sensitivity to common risk factors in stock returns,
which implies that stocks in different size and book-to-market portfolios may have different
expected returns. Therefore, stock i’s benchmark return at year t is the return of the portfolio
to which stock i belongs at the beginning of fiscal year t. To form a size- and BE/ME-excess
return for any stock, we simply subtract the return of the portfolio to which it belongs from
the realized return of the stock.12
Our baseline regression model is:
ri,t −RBi,t = γ0 + γ1
∆Ci,t
Mi,t−1
+ γ2
∆Ei,t
Mi,t−1
+ γ3
∆NAi,t
Mi,t−1
+ γ4
∆RDi,t
Mi,t−1
(9)
+ γ5
∆Ii,t
Mi,t−1
+ γ6
∆Di,t
Mi,t−1
+ γ7
Ci,t−1
Mi,t−1
+ γ8Li,t + γ9
NFi,t
Mi,t−1
+ γ10
Ci,t−1
Mi,t−1
∗ ∆Ci,t
Mi,t−1
+ γ11 Li,t ∗ ∆Ci,t
Mi,t−1
+ ²i,t,
where the term ∆X indicates unexpected changes in the variable X. As previously stated, we
initially use the realized change, assuming that the expected change is zero, and then conduct
a number of robustness tests with varying estimates of the unexpected change in cash.
The dependent variable in our regression is the excess stock return, ri,t −RBi,t, where ri,t is
the stock return for firm i during fiscal year t and RBi,t is stock i’s benchmark return at year
t. The independent variables are firm-specific factors that control for sources of value other
than cash that may be correlated with cash holdings. The financing variables that we are
interested in include the cash holdings of firm i at time t (Ci,t), interest expense (Ii,t), total
dividends (Di,t), market leverage at the end of fiscal year t (Li,t), and the firm’s net financing
during the fiscal year t (NFi,t). We also control for changes in the firm’s profitability using
earnings before interest and extraordinary items (Ei,t) and changes in the firm’s investment
policy by controlling for total assets net of cash (NAi,t) and R&D expenditures (RDi,t). To
avoid having the largest firms dominate the results, we deflate the firm-specific factors (except
leverage) by the one-year lagged market value of equity (Mi,t−1). Since the stock return is
the spread of (Mi,t −Mi,t1) divided by Mi,t−1, this standardization enables us to interpret the
14
estimated coefficients as the dollar change in value for a one-dollar change in the corresponding
independent variable.
Additionally, we add interaction terms to test the hypotheses stated in the previous section.
We use Ci,t−1Mi,t−1 ∗
∆Ci,t
Mi,t−1 in order to estimate the effect of changes in the value of cash for different
levels of cash holdings. Following the first hypothesis, we expect the coefficient γ7 to be
negative, indicating that the marginal value of cash is decreasing in the amount of cash the
firm has. We also include Li,t ∗ ∆Ci,tMi,t−1 in the regression to capture the effect of leverage on
the marginal value of cash holdings. Based upon our second hypothesis, we expect γ8 to be
negative, indicating that as firms have more leverage, less of the value created by the presence
of extra cash accrues to shareholders. In these regressions, we also include the lagged cash
position and the level of leverage to ensure that our estimated coefficients on the interaction
terms are due to the interaction, and not due to the cash position or leverage individually.
The methodology we use is essentially a long-term event study. Generally, the focus of event
studies is to estimate the effect of a firm event on the return of its common stock. In standard
event study methodology, the net present value of the event is estimated by looking at the
abnormal return experienced around the time of the event. The expected return is estimated
using a performance model whose parameters are estimated outside the event window. In
this paper, we focus on how the change of cash holdings affects stock returns, controlling for
other relevant changes in the firm’s financial status. The event in which we are interested
is the unexpected change of cash holdings, and the event window is defined to be the fiscal
year. Since there is not an estimation window, we instead estimate the expected return by
using the benchmark returns of the 25 size and book-to market portfolios. By subtracting the
benchmark return from the stock return, we control for the expected return of the stock. The
unexpected changes in the firm-specific factors should therefore explain the abnormal returns,
similar to an event study.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
The data for this paper come from the 2001 COMPUSTAT tapes (numbers in parentheses
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are COMPUSTAT data item numbers) and 2001 CRSP tapes over the 1971 to 2001 period.
We exclude all financial firms and utility firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, and between
4900 and 4999, respectively). Our measure of stock returns includes distributions during the
fiscal year. The breakpoints for the 25 portfolios formed on size and BE/ME and the portfolio
monthly returns are from Kenneth R. French’s webpage.13 All returns correspond to the
12-month period representing the fiscal year of the firm.
All data are converted to real values in 2001 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI).
The market value of equity is defined as the number of shares (54) multiplied by the stock’s
closing price at the fiscal year-end (199). Cash holdings equals cash plus marketable securities
(1). Net assets is total assets (6) minus cash holdings. Following Fama and French (1998) and
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004), earnings are calculated as earnings before extraordinary
items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits (18+15+50+51). Total
dividends are measured as common dividends paid (21). Leverage is defined as the market
debt ratio, calculated as total debt (9+34) over the sum of total debt and the market value of
equity. Net financing is total equity issuance (108) minus repurchases (115) plus debt issuance
(111) minus debt redemption (114). We also use R&D expenditures (46), which equals zero if
missing, and interest expense (15).
We trim our firm-specific factors and dependent variable at the 1% tails measured using
the full sample, to reduce the impact of outliers. Since we require one year of changes for some
variables, our usable sample starts in 1972. We eliminate firm-years for which net assets is
negative, the market value of equity is negative, or dividends are negative. Our final sample
consists of 82,187 firm-years. Summary statistics for the sample can be found in Table I.
Insert Table I - Summary Statistics here
Recall that all independent variables, excluding leverage (Lt), are deflated by the lagged
market value of equity, thereby allowing us to interpret our results as the dollar increase in
value associated with a one-dollar change in the explanatory variable. We see that the median
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firm has a -8.45% one-year excess (abnormal) stock return while the mean is slightly negative at
-0.50%, consistent with the distribution of abnormal stock returns being right-skewed.14 The
mean and median change in cash holdings are close to zero, suggesting that the distribution of
the change in cash holdings is relatively symmetric. However, the median cash holdings level
is equivalent to 9.45% of market equity value at the beginning of the fiscal year, while the
mean is much higher at 17.26%, suggesting that cash holdings are right-skewed. These two
numbers are slightly higher than the cash ratios in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson
(1999). Our statistics are not directly comparable to summary statistics in most other cash
papers in the literature, however, because most papers use net assets or book assets to scale
independent variables, whereas we use the lagged market value of equity, consistent with both
the discussion of our hypotheses and the normalization of our variables. Note that the median
leverage ratio of 22.65% and mean of 27.78% are consistent with Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999).
Table I also shows that on average profitability has been increasing over time as the changes
in earnings are positive both at the mean and the median, consistent with findings in Pinkowitz
and Williamson (2004). Firms’ research and development expenditures have also increased on
average over time. In contrast, interest expense and dividend payments appear to be quite
stable.
In order to test our third hypothesis, we must analyze separately those firms that face
greater financing constraints than others. There is a great deal of debate in the literature on
how to measure financial constraints. Following Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), we
use four alternative schemes to partition our sample.15
1. Payout Ratio
The payout ratio is measured as total dividends (total common dividends plus repur-
chases) over earnings. For each year from 1972 to 2001, we sort firms according to their
annual payout ratios and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group
those firms whose payout ratios are less (greater) than or equal to the payout ratio of
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the firm at the 30th (70th) percentile of the annual payout ratio distribution.16 Firms
with high payout ratios are more likely to have ample internal funds to cover their debt
obligations and to finance their investments, and should therefore receive lower benefits
from cash holdings than firms with low payout ratios. Additionally, Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen (1988) document that financially constrained firms have significantly lower
payout ratios.
2. Firm Size
Larger firms are thought to be better known and have better access to capital markets
than smaller firms, and should therefore face fewer constraints when raising capital to
fund its investments. We use sales (12) as our measure of firm size.17 For each year from
1972 to 2001, we rank all firms by their sales at the end of the previous fiscal year and
assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms whose sales are
less (greater) than or equal to the sales in the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual
size distribution.
3. Long-Term Bond Rating
Firms that have access to public debt markets are able to raise funds from a source
of capital that those without a rating are not able to access. The former firms are
usually better known, and should face less difficulty in raising funds for their investment
opportunities. COMPUSTAT provides data on firms’ bond ratings starting in 1985. We
assign to the financially unconstrained group those firm-years in which the firm has a
bond rating when they report positive debt and to the constrained group those firm-
years in which the firm does not have a bond rating but reports positive amounts of
debt.18 Faulkender and Petersen (2004) find that firms with a public debt rating (either
a long-term bond rating or commercial paper rating) have significantly higher leverage
ratios than firms without a debt rating, and the difference cannot be explained by firm
characteristics previously found to determine observed capital structure. This finding is
consistent with rated firms having better access to debt capital. They should therefore
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be not as reliant on internal funds as those firms without a debt rating, reducing their
marginal value of cash.
4. Commercial Paper Rating
Firms with a commercial paper rating are an even more exclusive set and are considered
among the safest group of publicly traded firms. We use the same categorization approach
as above except that we look at the commercial paper rating instead of the long-term
bond rating. The percentage of firm-years classified as having a commercial paper rating
is 9.0% relative to 21.7% of firm-years classified as having a public bond rating.
IV. Empirical Results
This section contains results of regressions that test our empirical predictions. We begin
in Section IV.A by testing the first two hypotheses, looking at the full sample over the entire
period. We then demonstrate in Section IV.B the robustness of these results using three
alternative measures of the unexpected change in cash over the fiscal year. In Section IV.C, we
examine the effect of capital market accessibility (our third hypothesis) by using our various
measures of financial constraints to subdivide the sample, testing the differences in the marginal
value of cash across the subsamples. In additional robustness checks in Section IV.D, we
examine three subsets of firms that are most likely to fall into the three cash regimes discussed
above, based upon their cash position, cash generation, and investment opportunities. We also
revisit the effects of capital market accessibility by examining the subset of firms that are most
likely to want to raise capital, and we look for differences in the marginal value of cash based
upon our four measures of financial constraints.
A. Findings for Cash Level and Leverage
One of our primary objectives is to measure the marginal value of cash for the average
firm. The results obtained from the estimation of our regression model (equation (1)) are
presented in Table II. The initial coefficient estimate corresponding to the change in cash
holdings suggests that an extra dollar of cash is only valued by shareholders at $0.75. Our
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results change dramatically, though, when we allow the change in cash to interact with the
level of cash (Ct−1 ∗∆Ct) and with leverage (Lt ∗∆Ct), as seen in column 2 of Table II. These
results indicate that the marginal value of cash is sensitive to both the amount of cash the firm
already has on hand and to the percentage of the firm’s capital structure that consists of debt.
Recall that these are the variables that we added to test our first two empirical predictions.
Having added these variables, the estimated marginal value of cash for a firm with zero cash
and no leverage is $1.47.
Insert Table II - Regression results for the whole sample here
As hypothesized, as firms’ cash positions improve, the value of an additional dollar of
cash decreases. The estimated coefficient corresponding to the interaction of the level of cash
holdings with the change in cash is negative and statistically significant at better than 1%.19
Economically, the estimate suggests that for two otherwise identical firms, a firm with cash
holdings of 5% of equity has a marginal value of cash that is nearly 7.4 cents higher than a
firm with cash holdings equal to 15% of its equity. In other words, for a firm with no leverage
and cash holdings equal to 5% of their equity market capitalization, the value of an additional
dollar of cash is $1.43 (=$1.466 + (-0.738*5%)), relative to $1.36 for an otherwise equivalent
firm with cash holdings equivalent to 15% of the value of their equity. This finding is consistent
with our first hypothesis that firms with little or no cash on hand are likely to raise costly
external funds and therefore would receive the highest benefits from having additional internal
funds.
The results are also consistent with our second hypothesis that the marginal value of cash is
decreasing in the amount of leverage. The significantly negative coefficient on Lt∗∆Ct suggests
that an extra dollar of cash in an all-equity firm is worth 14.3 cents more to shareholders than
an extra dollar in a firm with a 10% leverage ratio. This finding is consistent with debt holders
receiving some of the benefit associated with an increase in the amount of cash the firm holds.
As cash increases, the likelihood of the firm defaulting on the debt decreases, meaning that
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some of the value associated with the firm having additional cash accrues to debt holders. The
value of cash to shareholders is higher when the firm has very little debt since the change in
the likelihood of default is lower than when there is a large amount of leverage.
Having included the effects of both leverage and the level of cash holdings and discussed
the related findings, we can now estimate the marginal value of cash for the mean firm in our
sample. Since most firms have some cash and some leverage, the marginal value of cash estimate
is a function of the estimated coefficient on the marginal value of cash and the interactions
with the level of cash holdings and with leverage. So, using the estimates from the second
column, an extra dollar of cash holdings increases shareholder wealth by $1.466 if the firm has
zero cash and no leverage at the beginning of the fiscal year. However, the mean firm has cash
holdings equivalent to 17.26% of the market capitalization of equity at the beginning of the
fiscal year, and the mean leverage ratio is 27.78%. Therefore, the marginal value of cash to
shareholders in the mean firm is $0.94 (=$1.466 + (-$0.738*0.1726) + (-$1.433*0.2778)). This
finding suggests that less than the full value of the extra dollar of cash is incorporated into stock
prices, consistent with shareholders valuing cash held by the firm at its after-shareholder-tax
value.20
We also examine how the value of cash differs depending upon how cash is distributed to
shareholders. As discussed above, for those firms that pay out cash to shareholders, we expect
the value of an additional dollar of cash to be valued at less than a dollar since shareholders will
have to pay taxes on that dollar when it is distributed. However, the tax rate applied to that
dollar depends partially upon how it is paid. Throughout our sample period, the tax rate on
dividends was higher than the tax rate on capital gains, the rate that would normally apply in
the case of a share repurchase. Therefore, we expect that the marginal value of cash would be
higher over our sample period for those firms that predominately return cash to shareholders
in the form of repurchases rather than dividends.21
The results are consistent with our conjecture. In the third column of Table II, we examine
just those firm-years with positive earnings in which cash is distributed to equity holders. When
we include in our specification a variable interacting the change in cash with the percentage of
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distributions that occur in the form of repurchases, we find a significantly higher value on cash
for firms that predominately repurchase. Statistically, the coefficient is significant at better
than 10%. The economic magnitude suggests that the equity market values an additional dollar
of cash for a firm that carries out 100% of its equity payments in the form of repurchases 13.0
cents higher than an otherwise equivalent firm that pays out 100% of its equity payments in
the form of dividends. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the differential
tax schedules on dividends and capital gains faced by shareholders play an important role in
the value they place on the cash that firms hold.
Our estimated value difference naturally leads to the question of why dividend-paying firms
would forgo the additional value that would be created by altering their payout structure. This
question has puzzled researchers for years, leading to extensive examinations of payout policy.
The findings of this literature suggest that firms recognize the value to be gained by moving
towards repurchases. For instance, Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that beginning in 1999,
“industrial firms spent more money on share repurchases than on dividend payments,” (p.
1649) and that payout initiations are much more likely to be in the form of repurchases.
While firms have not uniformly adopted repurchases as their only form of cash distribution to
shareholders, the empirical evidence does suggest that firms are slowly moving more towards
share repurchases, consistent with the additional value creation we document.
B. Alternative Measures of the Expected Change in Cash
So far, we use the entire change in cash in our econometric specifications. Since we examine
changes in market values, the expected change in cash should be incorporated into the market
equity value of the firm at the beginning of the fiscal year and the change in value should
correspond to just the portion of the change in cash that is unexpected. Thus, the results that
we present so far assume that the expected level of cash at the end of the fiscal year is equal
to the value of cash at the end of the previous fiscal year. We now conduct robustness checks
that use three alternative measures of the expected change in cash over the fiscal year, and we
use the difference between the realized change and the expected change in our analysis.
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The first measure of the expected change in cash uses the average change in cash in the
benchmark portfolio during the corresponding fiscal year. If most firms in the same size
and book-to-market portfolio increase their cash positions during the fiscal year, then the
benchmark return should already reflect the effect of the average increase in cash, and the
excess return should be the response to the change not already reflected in the benchmark
return. As an example, assume that two firms both increase their cash position by 2% of
the market value of the firm’s equity. If most firms in the same size and book-to-market
portfolio as the first firm also have a similar increase in their cash position, then the market’s
response to the cash increase would be incorporated into the average return of the firms in the
benchmark portfolio, and the excess return should be close to zero. On the other hand, if the
second firm belongs to a size and book-to-market portfolio in which most firms decrease their
cash position, then the corresponding benchmark return would include this average decrease
in cash. Assuming that increases in cash increase the market value of the equity, we would
expect the excess return of the second firm in this example to be higher than that for the first
firm, all else equal, since the second firm increases its cash relative to the expected drop in
cash whereas the first firm increases its cash position, as it was expected to do. Results using
this alternative measure of the change in cash are presented in the first column of Table III.
For the other two measures of the unexpected change, we use two models from Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) to estimate the expected change of cash holdings, controlling
for industry fixed effects.22 In both cases, changes in cash are regressed on factors that represent
sources and uses of cash. We use the realizations of these factors at the end of the previous
fiscal year to estimate the change that is expected to occur in the current fiscal year and then
subtract those estimates from the realized change to obtain the unexpected piece. Since our
objective is to estimate the market’s expectation of the change of cash holdings that occurs
during the current fiscal year, we restrict ourselves to information the market had at the
beginning of the fiscal year. The first of these specifications is
∆CashHoldingsi,t = α0 + α1CashF lowi,t−1 + α2Qi,t−1 + α3Sizei,t−1 + ²i,t, (10)
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where Size is measured as the natural log of book assets. The second equation from Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) adds capital expenditures, acquisitions, the change in net
working capital, and the change in short-term debt as additional explanatory variables, all
lagged and deflated by the lagged market value of assets. The results using these estimates of
the unexpected change in cash appear in columns 2 and 3, respectively, of Table III.23
Insert Table III - Regressions with alternative definitions of the expected change in cash
holdings.
The results in Table III are nearly identical to those using the realized change in cash found
in column 2 of Table II, discussed above. The effects of leverage and cash levels are extremely
similar in magnitude and have the same strong statistical significance. More debt in the firm’s
capital structure and higher cash levels both correspond to significantly lower marginal values
of cash to the shareholders. After incorporating the leverage ratio and cash position of the
average firm in the sample, we estimate the marginal value of cash to be $0.95, $0.93, and
$0.95, respectively. Recall that we estimate a value of $0.94 when we use the entire change in
cash rather than estimates of the unexpected change in cash. Even though these alternative
methods should generate better estimates of the unexpected change in cash, they are still
highly correlated with the overall change in cash. So, while these alternative measures likely
have less noise, results using the absolute change in cash appear to be relatively unbiased. The
stability of the estimated coefficients demonstrate the robustness of our findings regarding the
value of additional corporate cash and how that value is influenced by the level of cash and
the portion of the firm’s capital structure that consists of debt.
C. Financial Constraints Results
Moving to the empirical implication that shareholders place a higher marginal value on the
cash of constrained firms than on the cash of unconstrained firms, we split the sample using
the four criteria outlined above. Table IV presents summary statistics for the constrained
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and unconstrained groups under the four different financial constraints criteria. The letter (C)
stands for constrained groups and (U) for unconstrained groups. The first row for each variable
reports the mean value for the corresponding variable, with medians in brackets. There is a
positive but imperfect association among the groups generated by the four criteria. Under all
four criteria, the median change in cash holdings is negative for constrained firms, whereas
the median change is zero or positive for unconstrained firms under three of the four criteria.
This suggests that firms that have greater difficulty accessing capital (constrained firms) are
more likely to draw down their cash holdings relative to unconstrained firms. Additionally,
constrained firms have higher cash holdings than unconstrained firms under all four criteria,
which is consistent with the findings in Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004). The intuition
is that constrained firms are more reliant on internal funds and therefore hold higher levels of
cash than do firms that can easily access more cash when they need it. It is worth noting that
with the exception of the use of firm size as our measure of a constrained firm, the number of
financially constrained firms is much higher than the number of unconstrained firms.
Place Table IV - Summary Statistics for constrained and unconstrained groups here.
Using all four criteria, the results from splitting the firm-years into constrained and uncon-
strained subsamples are strongly consistent with our hypothesis. We find that the marginal
value of cash is significantly higher for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. As
displayed in Table V, the estimated marginal value of cash for constrained firms, controlling
for the interaction with the level of cash and with leverage, is significantly higher than the es-
timate for unconstrained firms, both statistically and economically.24 The difference between
the coefficients for the two different subsamples is significantly at better than 1% under all
four criteria. Firms that can easily raise funds when they need cash should not carry a lot of
cash, and the market does not place a high value on such cash because of the costs associated
with holding cash (such as tax effects and agency costs). However, the market places a rather
high value on liquidity for those firms that may face problems raising external capital when
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they need to raise additional cash.
Place Table V - Regressions for constrained and unconstrained groups here.
The coefficients estimated on the interaction terms with cash holdings and leverage retain
the statistical significance found in Table II in almost all of the specifications. However,
the coefficients differ from each other across the subsamples. Under all four criteria, the
coefficient corresponding to the interaction of the change in cash holdings with the level of cash
is significantly more negative for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Constrained
firms have a higher marginal value of cash when their current cash position is extremely small,
consistent with internal cash being most valuable for firms that are likely to want to access
external capital and that would face higher transactions costs when doing so. However, if the
firm has a large cash balance, it is likely to distribute cash and the fact that it is constrained
will not impact the value of cash. This effect manifests itself in the form of the marginal value
of cash declining faster for constrained firms as cash holdings increase.
The differences in coefficients for the variable interacting the change in cash and leverage
are not as stable across subsamples, but the coefficients are statistically different from zero
in all of the specifications. This finding is consistent with debt holders receiving some of the
additional value derived from higher cash holdings for the firm, regardless of whether the firm
is financially constrained or unconstrained.
As before, since most firms have some cash on hand and debt in their capital structure,
testing our third empirical implication requires incorporating the three coefficient estimates
that include the change in cash as part of the corresponding variable’s measure. Using the
summary statistics from Table IV, we estimate that shareholders of a mean firm that is classified
as financially constrained under the payout ratio criteria place a value of $1.04 (=$1.674
+ (-$0.904*0.188) + (-$1.594*0.288)) on an extra dollar of cash, while shareholders of the
mean financially unconstrained firm only place a value of $0.77 (=$1.066 + (-$0.600*0.169)
+ (-$0.836*0.2369)) on an extra dollar of cash. These numbers support our third empirical
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implication in which we hypothesize that shareholders value the marginal dollar of cash for a
constrained firm more highly than they do the marginal value of cash for an unconstrained firm.
The estimated marginal values of cash under the other three constraint classifications are $1.09
versus $0.72 using size as the constrained criteria, $1.15 versus $0.73 using access to public debt
markets, and $1.09 versus $0.46 using access to the commercial paper market. Under all four
criteria, cash is more highly valued for constrained firms than it is for unconstrained firms. The
differences in the marginal value of cash are all significant at better than 1%. Economically, the
estimates range from $0.27 to $0.63, demonstrating how costly the market perceives difficulty
in accessing capital markets to be, and the extent to which firms are rewarded with higher
valuations for holding cash that helps them mitigate potential underinvestment.25
Looking at the differences in the other coefficients for the constrained versus unconstrained
firms, another interesting result emerges. The change in net assets has a higher coefficient
for the constrained firms relative to the unconstrained firms, a difference that is statistically
significant at better than 5% under all four specifications.26 While not the focus of our analysis,
this finding suggests that the market responds more positively to new investments made by
constrained firms. Together, these findings are consistent with the market responding more
favorably when constrained firms are able to fund investment (represented by the net assets
result) and when they are able to generate cash to fund future investments (represented by
the findings for cash).
As with the results that examine the first two hypotheses, we now seek to verify that
our results regarding the effects of financial constraints are robust to other estimates of the
unexpected change in cash holdings during the fiscal year. We therefore once again divide the
firms based upon our four constraints criteria and use the change in cash net of the average
change in cash in the benchmark portfolio that year in our regression specification.27 The
results of these tests are located in Table VI.
Place Table VI - Robustness Checks for Constrained and Unconstrained Groups here.
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When we replicate the examination of the marginal value of cash for constrained versus
unconstrained firms using this alternative measure of the unanticipated change in cash, the
results once again suggest that the marginal value of cash is significantly higher for constrained
firms relative to unconstrained firms. The coefficients of both the unexpected change in cash
variable and the interaction term corresponding to the product of the unexpected change in
cash and the level of cash are statistically different from each other under all four constraints
categorizations. Evaluated at the means for the two subsamples, the marginal value of cash
is $1.06 for the constrained group versus $0.77 for the unconstrained group using the payout
ratio as our classification criterion. Under the other three criteria, the values are $1.10 versus
$0.73, $1.19 versus $0.77, and $1.13 versus $0.39, respectively. Once again, these differences are
significantly different from each other at better than 1% under all four classification criteria.
These results further confirm our third hypothesis that the market places a significantly higher
value on an additional dollar of cash for those firms that are likely to face difficulty in accessing
external capital markets.
D. Subsample Tests
To verify the robustness of our cross-sectional results, we focus on three subsamples of
firms that are most likely to correspond to our three cash regimes and that should therefore
differ in the value shareholders place on additional cash in the firm. Specifically, we divide
the firms into quartiles based first upon a measure of interest coverage and separately upon
their average industry market-to-book ratio, defined by their two-digit SIC code.28 We define
interest coverage as the sum of the beginning cash position of the firm and its earnings in
that fiscal year divided by the interest expense over the fiscal year. A high interest coverage
firm has less of their cash and cash flow obligated to debt and therefore has relatively more
funds available for investment or distribution. We interpret the industry market-to-book ratio
as a measure of the firm’s investment opportunities, so the highest quarter of market-to-book
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firm-years should have a higher value placed on an extra dollar of internal cash. We use an
industry-level value because we want a measure that has not been affected by the market’s
incorporation into firm value the effect of financing constraints on the likelihood that the firm
will be able to capitalize on these investment opportunities.29
First, we focus on the firms that have the lowest coverage and lowest industry market-
to-book ratio. These are firms that have a relatively high portion of their cash and cash
flow obligated to interest payments and that do not have good investment opportunities. We
would therefore expect these firms to have low marginal cash values since they have relatively
few investment opportunities and a significant part of any additional cash the firm attains is
likely to go to the debt holders. The second group of firm-years have both low coverage and
high market-to-book ratios. Such firms are also low on cash holdings but are likely to have
investment opportunities, making them likely to have to access capital markets in order to
take advantage of their available investments. Internal cash is therefore expected to be highly
valued by these firms because it reduces the amount of costly external finance the firm would
need to raise, thereby making it more likely that the investments are made. Finally, we look at
firms that are in the top quarter of coverage ratios and the lowest quarter of market-to-book
ratios. Such firms are expected to have low marginal values of cash since they hold larger
balances, generate a great deal of cash, and do not have numerous investment opportunities,
that is they are likely to be distributing cash. In addition to tax effects, these cash cow firms
are also likely to suffer from agency costs described by Jensen (1986).
Insert Table VII - Results for three different coverage and M/B groups.
When we individually examine these three subsets of firm-years, the results of which are
reported in Table VII, we find further empirical support for our hypotheses.30 When we
evaluate the first subset of firm-years for the low coverage and low market-to-book ratio firm-
years, an additional dollar of cash is only valued at 45 cents. This finding is consistent with
a firm having few investment opportunities and with a large portion of an additional dollar
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of cash being claimed by the debt holders, thereby reducing the value of additional cash to
the equity holders. For the second set of firms, those with low interest coverage and many
investment opportunities, we find a marginal value of cash of $1.16. Consistent with our
expectation, shareholders in firms with investment opportunities and low internal funds place
a relatively higher value on the additional cash these firms attain. Finally, for the ‘cash cow’
firms, we find a marginal value of cash of only 53 cents. Combining these results, consistent
with the results for the full sample, we find that the market places a higher value on the cash
of those firms that are more likely to reinvest their cash into the firm and a lower value on the
cash of those firms that are likely to distribute the cash to debt or equity holders.
To further estimate the importance of capital market access, we focus on the subset of firms
that we estimate to have high marginal values of cash, namely, firms with investment oppor-
tunities but low coverage. Using this group of firms, we once again estimate the differences
in the marginal value of cash for those that are categorized as constrained relative to those
that are unconstrained. Since constrained firms are the firms that are most likely to want to
access the capital markets in the near future, differences in the market value of cash relative
to capital accessibility should be the greatest for this subset of firms.
Insert Table VIII - Constrained and Unconstrained groups with high M/B and low coverage.
Consistent with our earlier results, there are significant differences in the market value of
cash based upon how difficult it is expected to be for this subset of firms to raise additional
capital. As indicated by the results in Table VIII, the marginal value of cash is higher for
firms that are categorized as constrained under all four measures. Statistically, the differences
are significant at better than 5% in three of the four specifications.31 Looking at the three
criteria under which the difference is statistically significant, the economic interpretation of
the difference in the marginal value of cash between constrained and unconstrained firms in
this subsample ranges from 65 cents to $1.32. These differences are much greater than the
differences we estimate for the entire sample, consistent with our hypothesis that these firms
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are likely to be affected by their ability to access external capital. The results confirm that
access to capital markets is an extremely important factor in the value the market places on
an additional dollar of cash held by firms.
V. Conclusion
We use a revised event study methodology that examines market returns over firm fiscal
years to test empirical predictions about the cross-sectional variation in the market value of
cash. We find results consistent with all of our hypotheses. Specifically, we estimate that
for the mean firm-year in the sample, the marginal value of cash is $0.94. Additional cash is
most highly valued by shareholders of firms with low levels of cash holdings, low leverage, and
constraints in accessing financial markets. The marginal value of cash for the mean constrained
firm-year ranges from 28 to 63 cents higher than the mean unconstrained firm, depending upon
the constraints criterion. The results are even stronger when we focus on the subset of firms
that are likely to need to raise external capital in the near future.
Our results suggest that the market perceives the presence of market frictions that make
raising outside capital costly. The market rewards firms that retain liquidity with higher valu-
ations, consistent with such firms being able to create more value than an otherwise equivalent
firm with less internal cash. However, the results also suggest that the value of additional cash
diminishes in the level of cash, implying that there may be an upper bound on the amount of
cash for which the firm is rewarded for holding. This finding is consistent with both tax effects
and agency costs.
Unlike examinations that focus on the cross-sectional variation in cash holdings, we focus
on the value associated with those cross-sectional differences. Our methodology enables us to
estimate the value of liquidity more precisely than can be done by studies of differences in
levels of cash across firms or across time. As a result, we can estimate the magnitude of the
value loss associated with the market frictions we examine and the extent to which liquidity
can overcome these losses.
Considering the extent to which the market-to-book ratio is used to estimate value creation,
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and the potential biases that we argue may be associated with it, a methodology such as ours
that analyzes changes in value may have numerous other applications. As long as there is suf-
ficient time-series variation in the underlying firm characteristics, estimating market reactions
to such changes should provide more precise estimates of the value the equity holders place on
such characteristics of interest.
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Notes
1There has been some work that estimates the value implications of excess cash flow. For
instance, Hanson (1992) and Smith and Kim (1994) both find that bidding firms with high
excess free cash flow exhibit low excess stock returns around merger announcements. Their
estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the value destruction associated with high levels
of excess free cash flow.
2Other related papers include Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Pinkowitz and Williamson
(2001), Billett and Garfinkle (2004), Faulkender (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2002), Mikkelson
and Partch (2003), Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2005) and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Wruck
(2003).
3During the sample period, the appropriate tax rate τ
d
varied considerably depending upon
whether the cash distribution was done through a dividend payment or through a stock repur-
chase. We discuss this point in detail below.
4We would expect that this value differential would shrink in the future following the recent
reduction in the dividend tax rate for individuals. We do not yet have sufficient data to verify
that this has indeed occurred.
5In another related paper, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) extend the examination
to cross-country differences in the marginal value of cash.
6Hennessy and Whited (2005) argue that an additional dollar of debt is more valuable if
it goes to reducing costly external equity issuance rather than increasing cash distributions.
However, since they only investigate one-period risk-free debt, they do not have a situation
similar to our second regime discussed below.
7In the presence of agency costs, in which case there are conflicts between the interests of
shareholders and the interests of debt holders, we would similarly expect to find the value of
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cash holdings to equity holders decreasing with leverage. When the firm has a large amount
of debt, positive NPV projects could predominately benefit debt holders, leading to a debt
overhang (or Myers’ (1977) underinvestment) problem. Highly levered firms are more likely to
have debt overhang problems and pass up good projects.
8An exception is DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002), who suggest that financial con-
straints may actually be beneficial if the constrained firm is likely to waste additional cash
on negative NPV projects. So, if financially unconstrained firms are more likely to be run by
managers that only invest in positive NPV projects, whereas constrained firms are associated
with relatively worse managers, then additional cash would actually be valued higher by share-
holders of unconstrained firms. If this effect dominates, then we would expect the opposite of
our hypothesis, namely, that cash is more valuable for unconstrained firms. However, we do not
believe that our measures of financial constraints identify firms that invest in value-destroying
projects, so our hypothesis is unchanged.
9Initially, we examine the realized change in cash over the fiscal year, essentially assuming
that the market’s expectation of the level of cash at the end of the fiscal year is the cash level
at the end of the previous fiscal year. In robustness checks that follow the initial specification,
we use three alternative measures of the expected change in cash and then use the realized
change in cash net of the estimated expected change in cash.
10As a robustness check, we also use stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate as our
dependent variable and include the Fama and French three factors in the regression. Our
results are robust to such a specification.
11In unreported regressions, we standardized by the lagged book value of assets rather than
the lagged market value of equity and find strikingly different results, consistent with our
criticism of standardizing by book values. Results are available upon request.
12While the Fama and French 25 portfolios are formed at the end of each June, the fiscal year-
end of a firm could be any month during the year. Therefore, a firm could change the portfolio
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to which it belongs during the year. Consider a firm whose fiscal year ends in December in
year t − 1. From January to June of year t, it belongs to the portfolio according to the size
and BE/ME breakpoints of year t − 1 and from July to December of year t, it belongs to
the portfolio according to the size and BE/ME breakpoints of year t. Since we have value-
weighted monthly returns of the portfolios, we calculate the benchmark return by annualizing
the monthly returns from the portfolio it belongs to each month.
13See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french. We thank him for gra-
ciously providing the data.
14Recall that the observations are trimmed at the 1% tails, which explains the nonzero mean.
15Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) actually use five alternative schemes. Since they
do not find that the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index is effective, we do not use it.
16In this way we make sure that all firms with the same payout ratio are in the same group,
which generates an unequal number of observations being assigned to each of our groups.
17The results are robust to the use of total assets instead of sales.
18Whited (1992), Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)
similarly categorize constrained and unconstrained firms.
19All reported regressions use White (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent errors, corrected for
correlation across observations of a given firm.
20We add year dummies to our regression model to verify that the results are robust to
year effects that may be correlated with changes in firm characteristics. The results are not
significantly different and are available upon request.
21This analysis assumes that the market believes that future distributions will follow ap-
proximately the same mix of dividends and repurchases that the firm has used in the past
year. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) document that firms take up to three years to complete
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a repurchase program and numerous studies show that dividend payments are rather sticky
(for a comprehensive review, see Allen and Michaely (2002)). Together, these findings suggest
that there should be autocorrelation in distribution methods. We therefore argue that this is
a reasonable assumption for the market to make.
22We deviate slightly from their model by normalizing the change in cash holdings and cash
flow by the lagged market value of assets rather than current book value of assets, consistent
with all of the other normalizations in this paper.
23The estimates are robust to estimating the expected change in cash industry-by-industry.
24We only show the results in which the dependent variable is left-censored at the 1% tail
and right-censored at the 99% tail. The main results do not change if the dependent variable
is left-censored at 5% and right-censored at 95%. The results are available upon request.
25While this examination is motivated theoretically by transaction costs, we are not sug-
gesting that the differences in our estimates for constrained and unconstrained firms arise
solely from direct transaction costs. Certainly, a portion of the magnitude may arise from
the value effects of differences in the information the market possesses across our constraint
classifications, consistent with the financial intermediation literature, as well as from potential
differences in moral hazard across the subsets.
26The statistical significance of this difference is also found in the robustness checks we run
using alternative measures of the expected change in cash (Table VI).
27We also reestimate the results using the two estimates of the expected change in cash
holdings following Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004); the results are economically and
statistically similar. The results are available upon request.
28We also estimate these values using different cutoffs, such as thirds (9 groups) instead of
quarters (16 groups). As expected, the magnitude of the differences in the estimates of the
marginal value of cash across the subsamples increases as we increase the number of groups.
40
However, since the number of observations in each group decreases, the statistical difference
between the estimates does not change a great deal.
29We also conduct robustness tests in which we use the individual firm’s market-to-book
ratio and the results are similar, statistically and economically.
30Note that in these regressions, we no longer interact the change in cash holdings with either
the leverage ratio or the cash level, similar to the results presented in the first column of Table
II. Since the cash level and interest expense are both used in classifying into which group the
firm-year belongs, the cash level and leverage variables will have less variation within most of
subsamples. Therefore, having controlled for their effects in the group categorization process,
they have a much smaller impact in the subsample regressions, so we omit them.
31Few firm-years in the sample (126) with access to the commercial paper market also have
high market-to-book ratios and low coverage. This may explain the insignificant difference that
obtains when we use the presence of a commercial paper rating as our measure of financial
constraint.
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Table I
Summary Statistics for the 1972-2001 Sample
Variable Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Std. Dev.
ri,t −Ri,t -0.0050 -0.3403 -0.0845 0.2014 0.5592
∆′Ct 0.0036 -0.0382 -0.0005 0.0348 0.1514
Ct−1 0.1726 0.0346 0.0945 0.2155 0.2248
∆′Et 0.0105 -0.0382 0.0063 0.0461 0.2137
∆′NAt 0.0190 -0.0871 0.0292 0.1599 0.5464
∆′RDt 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0196
∆′It 0.0008 -0.0040 0.0000 0.0070 0.0349
∆′Dt -0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0100
Lt 0.2778 0.0616 0.2265 0.4445 0.2416
NFt 0.0518 -0.0291 0.0015 0.0866 0.2604
This table provides summary statistics for the variables in our sample of firm-years from U.S.-
based publicly traded firms over the period 1972 to 2001. ri,t −RBi,t is the excess stock return,
where ri,t is the annual stock return of firm i at time t (fiscal year-end) and RBi,t is stock i’s
benchmark portfolio return at time t. All variables except Lt and excess stock return are
deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mt−1). Ct is cash plus marketable securities,
Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment
tax credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest expense, total dividends
(Dt) are measured as common dividend paid, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is the total
equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. ∆Xt is compact
notation for the one-year change, Xt−Xt−1. The subscript t−1 means the value of the variable
is at the beginning of fiscal year t or at the end of fiscal year t− 1.
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Table II
Regression Results for the Whole Sample
Independent
Variables I II III
∆Ct 0.751*** 1.466*** 1.030***
( 0.02 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.054 )
∆Et 0.529*** 0.524*** 0.806***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.027 )
∆NAt 0.151*** 0.161*** 0.155***
( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.01 )
∆RDt 1.350*** 1.302*** 1.423***
( 0.139 ) ( 0.138 ) ( 0.234 )
∆It -1.516*** -1.448*** -1.922***
( 0.085 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.116 )
∆Dt 2.534*** 2.504*** 2.851***
( 0.188 ) ( 0.186 ) ( 0.229 )
Ct−1 0.337*** 0.263*** 0.212***
( 0.012 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.015 )
Lt -0.475*** -0.477*** -0.417***
( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.011 )
NFt 0.087*** 0.059*** 0.017
( 0.013 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.017 )
Ct−1 ∗∆Ct -0.738*** -0.433***
( 0.055 ) ( 0.069 )
Lt ∗∆Ct -1.433*** -1.086***
( 0.074 ) ( 0.104 )
Ret -0.014**
( 0.006 )
Ret ∗∆Ct 0.130*
( 0.07 )
Intercept 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.082***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ( 0.004 )
Observations 82187 82187 46444
Adj R2 0.19 0.20 0.20
This table presents the results of regressing the excess stock return ri,t −RBi,t on changes in firm characteristics over the
fiscal year. All variables except Lt and excess stock return are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mt−1).
Ct is cash plus marketable securities, Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and
investment tax credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest expense, total dividends (Dt) are
measured as common dividends paid, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is the total equity issuance minus repurchases
plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. We also use RDt expenditure, which is set to zero if missing and Re is the
percentage of distributions to shareholders that occur in the form of repurchases (repurchase/(repurchase+dividend)).
∆Xt is compact notation for the one-year change, Xt − Xt−1. The subscript t − 1 means the value of the variable is
at the end of fiscal year t − 1. The third regression is only on the subset of firms with positive earnings and positive
payout in the corresponding fiscal year. White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors, corrected for correlation across
observations of a given firm, are in parentheses (White, 1980). * corresponds to significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
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Table III
Regressions with Alternative Definitions of the Expected Change in Cash
Holdings
Independent
Variables Portf. Ave. ACW (1) ACW (2)
∆′Ct 1.463*** 1.511*** 1.520***
( 0.038 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.043 )
∆′Et 0.523*** 0.498*** 0.483***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.014 )
∆′NAt 0.161*** 0.175*** 0.189***
( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 )
∆′RDt 1.309*** 1.408*** 1.363***
( 0.138 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.152 )
∆′It -1.478*** -1.406*** -1.520***
( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.097 )
∆′Dt 2.589*** 2.715*** 2.862***
( 0.184 ) ( 0.186 ) ( 0.223 )
Ct−1 0.250*** 0.238*** 0.252***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.014 )
Lt -0.497*** -0.489*** -0.496***
( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.01 )
NFt 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.033**
( 0.012 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.014 )
Ct−1 ∗∆′Ct -0.789*** -0.739*** -0.839***
( 0.055 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.07 )
Lt ∗∆′Ct -1.361*** -1.619*** -1.530***
( 0.074 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.085 )
Intercept 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.080***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 )
Observations 82187 81979 67859
Adj R2 0.20 0.20 0.21
This table presents the results of regressing the excess stock return ri,t −RBi,t on changes in firm characteristics over the
fiscal year. All variables except Lt and excess stock return are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mt−1). ∆′Ct
is compact notation for the realized one-year change in cash relative to the expected change in cash for that specification
(details provided in Section V.B). Ct is cash plus marketable securities, Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest
expense, total dividends (Dt) are measured as common dividends paid, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is the total equity
issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. We also use RDt expenditure, which is set to zero
if missing. ∆Xt is compact notation for the one-year change, Xt − Xt−1. The subscript t − 1 means the value of the
variable is at the end of fiscal year t−1. White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors, corrected for correlation across
observations of a given firm, are in parentheses (White, 1980). * corresponds to significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
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Table IV
Summary Statistics for Constrained and Unconstrained Groups
Financial Payout Ratio Firm Size Bond Ratings Comm. Paper Ratings
Criteria (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
dCt 0.0034 -0.0078 -0.0051 0.0063 -0.0005 0.0085 0.0015 0.0015
[ -0.0015 ] [ -0.0027 ] [ -0.0050 ] [ 0.0004 ] [ -0.0010 ] [ 0.0004 ] [ -0.0007 ] [ 0.0000 ]
Ct−1 0.1884 0.1686 0.2152 0.1344 0.1559 0.1222 0.1569 0.0626
[ 0.0993 ] [ 0.0958 ] [ 0.1203 ] [ 0.0718 ] [ 0.0791 ] [ 0.0519 ] [ 0.0789 ] [ 0.0334 ]
dEt 0.0249 -0.0315 0.0196 0.0032 0.0095 0.0036 0.0091 -0.0008
[ 0.0092 ] [ -0.0057 ] [ 0.0049 ] [ 0.0057 ] [ 0.0044 ] [ 0.0052 ] [ 0.0050 ] [ 0.0031 ]
dNAt -0.0116 -0.0193 0.0278 0.0203 0.0370 0.0776 0.0456 0.0492
[ 0.0271 ] [ 0.0076 ] [ 0.0178 ] [ 0.0301 ] [ 0.0321 ] [ 0.0379 ] [ 0.0351 ] [ 0.0243 ]
dRDt 0.0007 0.0007 0.0014 0.0005 0.0009 0.0005 0.0009 0.0004
[ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ]
dIt -0.0005 0.0007 0.0012 0.0006 0.0004 0.0036 0.0011 0.0009
[ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0002 ] [ 0.0001 ] [ 0.0007 ] [ 0.0002 ] [ 0.0001 ]
dDt -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0001
[ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0000 ] [ 0.0004 ]
Lt 0.2873 0.2369 0.2149 0.3079 0.2537 0.3466 0.2771 0.2447
[ 0.2176 ] [ 0.1874 ] [ 0.1268 ] [ 0.2694 ] [ 0.1913 ] [ 0.3046 ] [ 0.2210 ] [ 0.2177 ]
NFt 0.0744 0.0124 0.0762 0.0321 0.0549 0.0619 0.0604 0.0154
[ 0.0073 ] [ -0.0046 ] [ 0.0028 ] [ 0.0012 ] [ 0.0019 ] [ 0.0043 ] [ 0.0028 ] [ -0.0023 ]
Observations 32822 24436 25152 24022 34691 9608 40300 3999
This table presents summary statistics for key variables across groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms
(see text for definitions) from 1972 to 2001. The first number corresponds to the mean and the medians are in brackets.
We use letter (C) for constrained firms and (U) for unconstrained firms. ri,t −RBi,t is the excess stock return, where ri,t
is the annual stock return of firm i at time t (fiscal year-end) and RBi,t is stock i’s benchmark portfolio return at time t.
All variables except Lt and excess stock return are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mt−1). Ct is cash plus
marketable securities, Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax
credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest expense, total dividends (Dt) are measured as common
dividends paid, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is the total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus
debt redemption. ∆Xt is compact notation for the one-year change, Xt −Xt−1. The subscript t− 1 means the value of
the variable is at the beginning of fiscal year t or at the end of fiscal year t− 1.
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Table V
Regressions for Constrained and Unconstrained Groups
Independent Payout Ratio Firm Size Bond Ratings Comm. Paper Ratings
Variables (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
∆Ct 1.674*** 1.066*** 1.621*** 1.123*** 1.706*** 1.339*** 1.685*** 0.707***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.161 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.217 )
p-value (C − U 6= 0) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
∆Et 0.480*** 0.459*** 0.490*** 0.505*** 0.497*** 0.537*** 0.500*** 0.522***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.075 )
∆NAt 0.160*** 0.123*** 0.180*** 0.118*** 0.190*** 0.095*** 0.177*** 0.122***
( 0.009 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.026 )
∆RDt 1.399*** 0.474 1.655*** -0.105 0.933*** 0.301 0.946*** -0.802
( 0.171 ) ( 0.314 ) ( 0.202 ) ( 0.287 ) ( 0.189 ) ( 0.538 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.771 )
∆It -1.249*** -1.084*** -1.010*** -1.710*** -1.640*** -1.525*** -1.604*** -3.220***
( 0.118 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.175 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.152 ) ( 0.251 ) ( 0.134 ) ( 0.58 )
∆Dt 2.115*** 2.703*** 3.725*** 1.750*** 1.661*** 0.665 1.459*** 0.569
( 0.377 ) ( 0.266 ) ( 0.405 ) ( 0.317 ) ( 0.311 ) ( 0.599 ) ( 0.286 ) ( 1.009 )
Ct−1 0.321*** 0.206*** 0.272*** 0.326*** 0.309*** 0.420*** 0.327*** 0.312***
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.049 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.082 )
p-value (C − U 6= 0) 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Lt -0.555*** -0.317*** -0.547*** -0.446*** -0.657*** -0.638*** -0.642*** -0.405***
( 0.013 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.035 )
NFt 0.083*** -0.027 0.132*** -0.006 0.064*** 0.059* 0.049** 0.104
( 0.018 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.065 )
Ct−1 ∗∆Ct -0.904*** -0.600*** -1.014*** -0.219** -0.860*** -0.145 -0.756*** 0.271
( 0.083 ) ( 0.098 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 0.093 ) ( 0.184 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.287 )
Lt ∗∆Ct -1.594*** -0.836*** -1.451*** -1.229*** -1.646*** -1.716*** -1.724*** -1.089*
( 0.104 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.125 ) ( 0.319 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.581 )
Intercept 0.057*** -0.014*** 0.022*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.134*** 0.084*** 0.067***
( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.009 )
Observations 32822 24436 25152 24022 34691 9608 40300 3999
Adj R2 0.22 0.16 0.2 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.11
This table presents regression results across groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms (see text for de-
finitions) from 1972 to 2001. We use letter (C) for constrained firms and (U) for unconstrained firms. The dependent
variable in all regressions is ri,t −RBi,t the excess stock return, where ri,t is the annual stock return of firm i during fiscal
year t and RBi,t is stock i’s benchmark portfolio return during fiscal year t. All variables except Lt and excess stock return
are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mt−1). Ct is cash plus marketable securities, Et is earnings before
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash
holdings. It is interest expense, total dividends (Dt) are measured as common dividends paid, Lt is market leverage,
and NFt is the total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. We also use R&D
expenditure, which is set to zero if missing. ∆Xt is compact notation for the one-year change, Xt −Xt−1. The subscript
t− 1 means the value of the variable is at the end of fiscal year t− 1. White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors,
corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm, are in parentheses (White, 1980). Note: * corresponds to
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table VI
Robustness Checks for Constrained and Unconstrained Firms
Independent Payout Ratio Firm Size Bond Ratings Comm. Paper Ratings
Variables (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
∆′Ct 1.677*** 1.064*** 1.627*** 1.110*** 1.715*** 1.338*** 1.698*** 0.638***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.216 )
p-value (C − U 6= 0) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
∆′Et 0.476*** 0.458*** 0.482*** 0.509*** 0.494*** 0.531*** 0.496*** 0.528***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.068 )
∆′NAt 0.161*** 0.122*** 0.181*** 0.119*** 0.192*** 0.095*** 0.179*** 0.119***
( 0.009 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.028 )
∆′RDt 1.396*** 0.525* 1.652*** -0.139 0.941*** 0.277 0.950*** -0.77
( 0.171 ) ( 0.313 ) ( 0.203 ) ( 0.284 ) ( 0.189 ) ( 0.534 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.786 )
∆′It -1.291*** -1.105*** -1.030*** -1.771*** -1.649*** -1.463*** -1.598*** -3.190***
( 0.119 ) ( 0.185 ) ( 0.177 ) ( 0.148 ) ( 0.153 ) ( 0.252 ) ( 0.135 ) ( 0.599 )
∆′Dt 2.171*** 2.714*** 3.789*** 1.852*** 1.672*** 0.838 1.522*** 0.359
( 0.373 ) ( 0.266 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.309 ) ( 0.314 ) ( 0.616 ) ( 0.289 ) ( 1.002 )
Ct−1 0.299*** 0.191*** 0.247*** 0.328*** 0.292*** 0.411*** 0.308*** 0.317***
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.082 )
Lt -0.582*** -0.331*** -0.572*** -0.460*** -0.688*** -0.661*** -0.671*** -0.432***
( 0.014 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.034 )
NFt 0.088*** -0.019 0.140*** -0.004 0.071*** 0.061+ 0.054*** 0.113+*
( 0.018 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.064 )
Ct−1 ∗∆′Ct -0.970*** -0.658*** -1.090*** -0.217** -0.961*** -0.281 -0.868*** 0.254
( 0.083 ) ( 0.098 ) ( 0.093 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.093 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.285 )
p-value (C − U 6= 0) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lt ∗∆′Ct -1.517*** -0.766*** -1.365*** -1.155*** -1.481*** -1.547*** -1.572*** -1.083*
( 0.105 ) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.124 ) ( 0.317 ) ( 0.113 ) ( 0.583 )
Intercept 0.076*** -0.007 0.042*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.144*** 0.098*** 0.073***
( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.009 )
Observations 32509 23182 24702 23505 34367 9314 39882 3799
Adj R2 0.22 0.16 0.2 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.11
This table presents regression results across groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms (see text for de-
finitions) from 1972 to 2001. We use letter (C) for constrained firms and (U) for unconstrained firms. The dependent
variable in all regressions is ri,t −RBi,t the excess stock return, where ri,t is the annual stock return of firm i during fiscal
year t and RBi,t is stock i’s benchmark portfolio return during fiscal year t. All variables except Lt and excess stock return
are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mt−1). ∆′Ct is compact notation for the one-year change in cash
relative to the average one-year change in cash for the average firm in the corresponding benchmark portfolio. Ct is cash
plus marketable securities, Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment
tax credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest expense, total dividends (Dt) are measured as
common dividends paid, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is the total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance
minus debt redemption. We also use RDt expenditure, which is set to zero if missing. ∆Xt is compact notation for the
one-year change, Xt −Xt−1. The subscript t− 1 means the value of the variable is at the end of fiscal year t− 1. White
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors, corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm, are in parentheses
(White, 1980). Note: * corresponds to significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table VII
Results for Three Different Coverage and M/B Groups
Independent
Variables I II III
∆Ct 0.448*** 1.159*** 0.528***
( 0.06 ) ( 0.116 ) ( 0.07 )
∆Et 0.275*** 0.320*** 0.551***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.085 )
∆NAt 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.250***
( 0.012 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.047 )
∆RDt 0.43 0.929** 0.225
( 0.482 ) ( 0.431 ) ( 1.056 )
∆It -0.756*** -0.383 -1.624**
( 0.146 ) ( 0.372 ) ( 0.639 )
∆Dt 0.997** 2.309*** 5.436***
( 0.412 ) ( 0.893 ) ( 0.674 )
Ct−1 0.431*** 0.831*** 0.104***
( 0.048 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.031 )
Lt -0.439*** -0.614*** -0.439***
( 0.036 ) ( 0.047 ) ( 0.075 )
NFt 0.022 0.169*** -0.029
( 0.025 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.099 )
Intercept -0.024 0.02 -0.029***
( 0.02 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.01 )
Observations 6000 3234 3981
Adj R2 0.15 0.19 0.14
This table presents the results of regressing the excess stock return ri,t −RBi,t on changes in firm characteristics
over the fiscal year. All variables except Lt and excess stock return are deflated by the lagged market value of
equity (Mt−1). Ct is cash plus marketable securities, Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest,
deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest
expense, total dividends (Dt) are measured as common dividends paid, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is
the total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. We also use RDt
expenditure, which is set to zero if missing. ∆Xt is compact notation for the one-year change, Xt −Xt−1. The
subscript t− 1 means the value of the variable is at the end of fiscal year t− 1. Regression I is on the subset of
firms in the bottom quarter of interest coverage and the bottom quarter of the industry market-to-book ratio.
Interest coverage is defined to be (cash+earnings)/interest expense. Regression II is on firms in the bottom
quarter of interest coverage and the top quarter of the industry market-to-book ratio. Regression III is on firms
in the top quarter of interest coverage and the bottom quarter of the industry market-to-book ratio. White
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors, corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm, are in
parentheses (White, 1980). * corresponds to significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table VIII
Constrained and Unconstrained Firms with High M/B and Low Coverage
Independent Payout Ratio Firm Size Bond Ratings Comm. Paper Ratings
Variables (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
∆Ct 1.159*** 0.510** 1.166*** 0.489*** 1.506*** 0.186 1.343*** 1.934***
( 0.161 ) ( 0.245 ) ( 0.229 ) ( 0.174 ) ( 0.174 ) ( 0.212 ) ( 0.153 ) ( 0.722 )
p-value (C − U 6= 0) 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.41
∆Et 0.277*** 0.355*** 0.275*** 0.464*** 0.282*** 0.637*** 0.286*** 0.555**
( 0.064 ) ( 0.095 ) ( 0.104 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.137 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.219 )
∆NAt 0.011 0.092* -0.036 0.063 0.090** 0.036 0.089** -0.231**
( 0.049 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.1 )
∆RDt 0.953 0.349 1.38 0.466 0.647 0.714 0.704 3.021*
( 0.597 ) ( 0.96 ) ( 0.843 ) ( 0.681 ) ( 0.546 ) ( 0.796 ) ( 0.526 ) ( 1.752 )
∆It -0.386 -0.38 0.957 -1.361*** -1.062* -1.165 -1.196** 0.887
( 0.67 ) ( 0.61 ) ( 0.882 ) ( 0.44 ) ( 0.593 ) ( 0.798 ) ( 0.566 ) ( 1.605 )
∆Dt 1.721 3.247** 7.371*** 1.959* 0.96 2.427* 0.939 5.295
( 1.647 ) ( 1.314 ) ( 2.589 ) ( 1.14 ) ( 1.874 ) ( 1.428 ) ( 1.546 ) ( 3.488 )
Ct−1 0.830*** 0.728*** 0.686*** 0.586*** 0.987*** 0.475** 0.902*** 1.064*
( 0.17 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.245 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.178 ) ( 0.224 ) ( 0.154 ) ( 0.635 )
Lt -0.504*** -0.649*** -0.566*** -0.567*** -0.745*** -0.754*** -0.708*** -0.367
( 0.065 ) ( 0.101 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.103 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.132 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.231 )
NFt 0.341*** 0.1 0.395*** 0.064 0.233*** 0.172 0.269*** 0.270*
( 0.079 ) ( 0.087 ) ( 0.117 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.122 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.142 )
Intercept -0.109*** 0.061 -0.036 0.129*** -0.022 0.234*** -0.02 0.037
( 0.031 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.076 )
Observations 1404 821 861 843 1678 399 1827 126
Adj R2 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.18
This table presents regression results across groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms with low coverage
ratios and high industry market-to-book ratios (see text for definitions) from 1972 to 2001. We use letter (C) for
constrained firms and (U) for unconstrained firms. These are results of regressing the excess stock return ri,t − RBi,t on
changes in firm characteristics over the fiscal year. All variables except Lt and excess stock return are deflated by the
lagged market value of equity (Mt−1). Ct is cash plus marketable securities, Et is earnings before extraordinary items
plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits, and NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest
expense, total dividends (Dt) are measured as common dividends paid, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is the total equity
issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. We also use RDt expenditure, which is set to zero
if missing. ∆Xt is compact notation for the one-year change, Xt − Xt−1. The subscript t − 1 means the value of the
variable is at the end of fiscal year t−1. White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors, corrected for correlation across
observations of a given firm, are in parentheses (White, 1980). * corresponds to significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
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